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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEEAT SALT LAKE MINEEALS I 
& CHEMICALS COEPOEATION, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
I Appeal No. 
VS
' / 13858 
ARTHUR G. McKEE & COMPANY, I 
a Delaware corporation, 1 
Defendant-Respondent. J 
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT SHOW ERROR 
IN APPELLANT'S POSITION 
In our brief we pointed to the evidence which shows 
a duty or obligation on McKee's part relative to the 
Houben bond, a breach of that duty by McKee, and that 
GSL sustained damage as a proximate result of that 
breach. "We also showed that the trial court's findings 
of fact to the contrary are not supported by the evi-
dence1 and that the court erred in its conclusions of law. 
For clarity, we will examine respondent's response 
under the headings of our opening brief. 
1The substantial evidence required to support findings of fact is "more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence." Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Ut. 61, 
239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). 
1 
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I 
McKEE IS LIABLE TO GSL IN THE 
AMOUNT OF THE PERFORMANCE BOND 
WHICH WAS REQUIRED OF HOUBEN. 
A. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent 
included the duty to see that Houben was bonded: — 
We pointed out in our opening brief that it was McKee's 
duty to see that Houben obtained the performance bond 
required by the purchase order McKee issued to Houben 
(pp. 16-19) and that GSL did not assume that duty 
(pp. 37-39).2 McKee has cited two exhibits and the 
testimony of three witnesses to sustain its assertion 
that there was substantial evidence to support Finding 
of Fact No. 6 (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-13). An ex-
amination of each of these items of evidence discloses 
that they sustain GSL's position and do not support 
the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
on this issue. 
1. The minutes of the meeting held on August 
20, 1969? It will be recalled that McKee had overall 
project design responsibility for GSL's process plants 
and purchased many items including the conveyor sys-
2The trial court's memorandum decision did not question McKee's duty. 
(R. 86.) The findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by counsel 
for McKee are inconsistent. They do not disclose the "discerning line for 
decision," United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651, 
656-657 (1964), but range all the way from a theory of non-duty and non-
fault on McKee's part to the conflicting theories of waiver, contributory neg-
ligence and estoppel on GSL's part. 
See the following additional comments with respect to the importance of 
the preparation of findings of fact in cases tried to the court: Kelson v. United 
States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294-1295 (CA. 10, 1974); and particularly United 
States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-943 (CA. 2, 1942). 
3Exhibits 23-D and 27-P are copies of the same minutes. 
s 
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tern as "contract packages'' from "outside vendors." 
(Opening brief, p. 5.) The flow of certified drawings 
and other engineering information between McKee's 
engineers and its vendors was critical to the project 
time schedule. Hence GSL's offer and McKee's accept-
ance of Mr. Derricott's services to expedite the flow 
of engineering information. (Andrews, Tr. 42; Brink-
mann, Tr. 54.) The minutes of the August 20 meeting 
are directly to the point of Mr. Derricott's duties. 
The opening paragraph, not mentioned in McKee's 
brief (p. 11), says that on August 20, 1969, representa-
tives of GSL and McKee sat down 
"to confirm the expediting procedure to secure 
outstanding engineering information that is criti-
cal to the project schedule." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The third paragraph says that Mr. Derricott was 
to perform the expediting, 
"which is indicated in the minutes of weekly 
meetings and as supplemented by other communi-
cations from McKee Engineering. * * *" 
The fourth paragraph refers to Material Control 
documents and to Purchase Order supplements as addi-
tional sources of the engineering information required. 
The last paragraph, not mentioned by McKee, con-
cludes with a further reference to the subject of Mr. 
Derricott's duties: 
"Engineering information should be transmitted 
according to the purchase order instruction." 
3 
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The memorandum does not say that Mr. Derricott 
was to follow up on non-engineering matters such as 
bonds. The memorandum is silent on such matters. As 
the memorandum shows, Mr. Ferguson, McKee's pur-
chasing agent for the project, was present at the meet-
ing, but when he testified he did not contradict the mem-
orandum (Tr. 175-176) : 
Q. (ME. BAKER) Can you tell me what the 
actual practice was relative to the expediting that 
Mr. Derricott did? 
A. (ME. FEEGUSON) He had access to the 
documents pertaining to the Purchase Order, and 
he could expedite, from his position, drawings 
and such without contacting me. However, the 
way it worked in practice, as I recall, is that 
we would be — we would have conversations 
with each other frequently and if drawings were 
missing on a particular order he would say, 
"Have you heard anything from such and such 
a vendor?" And I might say, "No, I haven't, 
but I am going to be calling them later today. 
I will ask them." Or I might say, " I will call 
them." We had this sort of interchange where 
we worked presently with each other. 
No witness said that Mr. Derricott ?s duties were other 
than as stated in the memorandum. 
Four weeks after the meeting on engineering mat-
ters, on September 18, 1969, McKee issued its purchase 
order for the conveyor system requiring that Houben 
be bonded. (Ex. 11-P.) There is no evidence that McKee 
ever asked Mr. Derricott to follow up on the bond. 
4 
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2. Mr. Bririkmann's engineering report of Octo-
ber 6,1969* It is clear from a reading of the document 
and from Mr. Brinkmann's testimony (Tr. 44-55), not 
mentioned in McKee's brief (p. 11), that his report was 
talking about the same subject as the minutes of the 
August 20 meeting, namely GrSL's participation in the 
expediting of engineering information. The very por-
tion of the report quoted by McKee (p. 11) is in accord 
with the minutes of the August 20 meeting and with 
Mr. Ferguson's testimony regarding Mr. Derricott's 
duty to expedite vendor drawings. 
3. Testimony of Mr. Andrews. Nothing was 
said by Mr. Andrews, in the testimony cited by McKee 
(p. 12) with respect to following up on non-engineer-
ing matters. Mr. Andrew's testimony on the subject 
of Mr. Derricott's duties (Tr. 41-42) and the testimony 
of Mr. Brinkmann on that subject (Tr. 54-58) was not 
mentioned in McKee's brief. 
4. Testimony of Mr. Derrieott. There is no 
statement in the portion of Mr. Derricott's deposition, 
which was read at the trial and cited in McKee's brief 
(p. 12), that his assistance to McKee included the fol-
low up on non-engineering information such as bonds. 
Mr. Derrieott acknowledged the obvious, that McKee's 
purchase order called for a bond, but neither he nor 
anyone else said that his duties included non-engineer-
ing matters such as bonds. It is significant, we believe, 
that counsel never asked Mr. Derrieott or anyone else 
^Exhibit 19-D. • . , . . ; , 
5 
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if Mr. Derricott's duties included assistance to McKee 
in following up on non-engineering matters such as bonds. 
5. Testimony of Mr, Ferguson. The testimony 
cited in McKee's brief (p. 12) goes to the general duties 
of an expediter, many of which Mr. Ferguson performed 
on this project. (Tr. 180-185.) The testimony imme-
diately following the cited portion, going to Mr. Derri-
cott's duties assigned in the August 20 meeting (Ex. 
27-P), confirms that those duties involved engineering 
information (Tr. 175-176). Mr. Ferguson never said 
that Mr. Derricott's duties included following up on 
bonds. 
No mention is made in McKee's brief of Mr. Fergu-
son's testimony that it was he who had responsibility 
for the administration of the purchase orders issued by 
McKee on GSL's project and that he followed up on 
other non-engineering matters (Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P, 
56-P) as he did with respect to Houben's bond (Tr. 175, 
177,180-185). 
No evidence is cited by McKee to show that at any 
time McKee turned over to GSL the responsibility for 
the bond called for in McKee's purchase order. We have 
set forth in our opening brief (pp. 6-10, 37-39) the evi-
dence on the subject of responsibility for the bond. 
B. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent 
included the duty of prompt action including notice with 
respect to the performance bond required of Houben: — 
McKee does not challenge the point that an agent is 
6 
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bound to act promptly and with diligence while on his 
principal's business and to give timely notice if he finds 
himself unable or unwilling to carry out his undertak-
ing. There is no evidence that McKee ever asked to 
be relieved of its responsibility with respect to the bond-
ing of Houben or that before November 6 or 20, 1969, 
it called to GiSL's attention Houben's failure to obtain 
the bond. Mr. Ferguson's testimony that after Novem-
ber 6 or 20 he probably or possibly told someone at 
GSL of his telephone call to Houben (Tr. 178, 184-185) 
is refuted by the sworn answers to interrogatories,5 
which he helped prepare (Tr. 195-196), that McKee did 
not tell GSL that a bond had not been obtained. 
•C. GSL ivas damaged by McKee's failure to act 
promptly and is entitled to recover from McKee the 
amount of the bond: — McKee does not challenge GSL's 
point that had the bond been obtained without delay it 
would have been available to GSL when Houben left 
the job as Mr. McNeil and Mr. Ferguson testified. (Tr. 
183, 275). Nor does McKee challenge the point that the 
amount of the bond is the measure of GSL's damage. 
Instead McKee argues in its brief (p. 27) that 
Houben could have been terminated and all amounts 
due Houben could have been retained by GSL as stated 
in Finding of Fact No. 7 (R. 89). This argument and 
the finding ignore the provisions of the bond. (Ex. 16-P.) 
The surety would have been liable either (1) to com-
5Question No. 9 (R. 12) and the answer (R. 21). See footnote 6 at 
page 7 of our opening brief. 
7 
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plete the contract or (2) to obtain a contractor and to 
advance funds sufficient to pay the cost of completion. 
Assuming the surety company would have elected the 
second alternative, it would have had to advance the 
sum of $300,000. For example: 
Cost of completion $1,080,2596 
Less balance of contract price: 
Amount payable to 
contractor $739,344 
Less amount properly 
paid to contractor 57,7347 681,610 
$ 398,649 
Surety would advance (not 
to exceed amount of bond) $ 300,000 
McKee points to no testimony that GSL would 
have derived any benefit from the termination of Houben 
in November or later. McKee's officers on the project 
clearly believed that termination would not have been 
appropriate. Mr. McNeil who was in charge and knew 
Houben was not bonded took no action to terminate 
Houben and did not suggest that GSL do so. He ap-
proved payment to Houben. (Tr. 275-276.) Mr. McNeil's 
suggestion that other engineering companies could have 
completed the conveyor system was given without hav-
ing raised the question with those companies. He did 
not consider (1) the cost of delay in replacing Houben, 
(2) whether other companies would have done the work 
6Ex. 15~P, less April 1970 payment to Houben of $105,565 which was 
paid after GSL had learned there was no bond. Mr. Brinkmann testified that 
the payment was made by his mistake, and contrary to Mr. Andrews' instruc-
tions. (Tr. 229-230.) 
7Ex. 15-P, page 2, line 3. 
8 
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at their earlier bid prices after learning the first con-
tractor would be replaced, (3) whether Houben would 
have consented to its replacement, and (4) whether 
Coastal Plains, one of the original bidders, would have 
given the guarantee which earlier it had refused to 
give, (See the evidence reviewed in our opening brief 
at pp. 14-15,42.) 
The proposition is advanced in McKee's brief that 
Houben could not have obtained a bond in September 
or October 1969 (pp. 25-26). No evidence has been cited 
in its support. Mr. Parker, who was called by McKee 
and was specifically asked by the trial court at what 
point Houben could not have obtained a bond, said 
"after October of 1969 I don't think they could have." 
(Tr. 172-173.) The Finding of Fact No. 9, which was 
proposed by McKee and which McKee now appears to 
challenge, did not say that Houben could not have ob-
tained a bond in September or October. The finding 
says probably Houben would not have been able to ob-
tain a bond on November 14, 1969. (R. 90) McKee's 
people, who had investigated Houben, including its fi-
nancial situation (Tr. 275), after representing to GSL 
that McKee's vendors came from a list of " qualified 
and acceptable bidders" (Ex. 24-P, part P-3, at p. 3) 
and who knew a bond was required,8 believed that 
McKee could be bonded on August 21 (Ex. 9-P) and 
September 18 (Ex. 11-P). If not, an admission has been 
made that McKee breached its duty of care for GSL's 
8McKee acknowledged in paragraph 5 of its answer to the complaint 
(R. 6, par. 5) and in its answers to interrogatories that a bond was required 
of Houben (Answer to questions 20 and 22 in GSL's first set of interrogatories 
(R. 13-14,23)). 
9 
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interests when it contracted with Houben for the con-
veyor system. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT GSL IS BARRED BY WAIVER 
OR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR IS 
ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING FROM 
McKEE. 
A. GSL did not ivaive its rights as against McKee 
with respect to the bond: — McKee's brief does not 
point to any evidence of these essential elements of 
waiver:° 
(a) that GSL intended to relinquish its rights 
with respect to the bonding of Houben, 
(b) that GSL expressed such an intention dis-
tinctly, 
(c) that McKee gave any consideration to be 
released from its duties to GSL, 
(d) that McKee understood and accepted the 
asserted waiver, and 
(e) that the asserted waiver was timely. 
"Without evidence of the elements of waiver, the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with 
respect to waiver are unsupported. (See our discussion 
of these elements in the light of evidence at pp. 29-31 
of our opening brief.) 
9Opening brief, pp. 26-29. 
10 
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The cases cited by McKee (pp. 37-41) are not to 
the point. In the only cases involving bonds, Lesser v. 
William Holiday Cord Associates, Inc., 349 F.2d 490 
(C.A. 8, 1965), and Hevenor v. Union Railroad Co. of 
New York City, 198 N.Y.S. 409 (1923), the bonds 
were required as conditions precedent to the commence-
ment of the work but the contractor, with owner's knowl-
edge, commenced work without the bond. Not so in this 
case. Here McKee authorized Houben to commence work 
some four weeks before it got around to stating the re-
quirement for a bond. The requirement in this case was 
that a bond be obtained and copies be delivered to McKee 
"without delay." No waiver was found in Phoenix 
Insurance Company v. Heath, 90 Ut. 187, 61 P.2d 308 
(1936), or in American Savings and Loan Association v. 
Blomquist, 21 TL2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968). In Ahrendt 
v. Bobbitt, 119 Ut. 465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951), the ques-
tion, as this court stated, was "whether this condition 
precedent could be waived" (229 P.2d at 297). The 
question was not, as it is here, whether the evidence 
supported a finding of waiver. In Ahrendt there was 
no transcript of the evidence and under those circum-
stances this court had to assume that the evidence sus-
tained the finding. The cases cited by McKee, there-
fore, do not contradict the law as set forth at pp. 26-31 
of our opening brief. 
B. The defense of contributory negligence is not 
available to McKee in this case: — The authorities cited 
by McKee (pp. 34-35) do not contradict the rule that 
a principal's negligence will not relieve an agent of 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
liability based in contract as opposed to tort. But even 
if the law were otherwise or if GrSL were asserting 
liability based only in tort, McKee has failed to show 
any causal connection between the events which occurred 
in November 1969 (referred to at pp. 14-15 of its brief) 
and the injury GSL sustained by reason of McKee's 
failure to see that the bond was obtained without delay. 
All of the events referred to by McKee occurred after 
the opportunity for bonding Houben had passed, as the 
following chronology of events shows: 
12 
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AUGUST 
1 
SEPTEMBER 
| 1 
OCTOBER NOVEMBER 
I I I I 
DECEMBER 
21 18 6 14 18 20 1 
< 4 weeks X 7 weeks > 
August 21 — McKee letter of itent to Houben.10 
September 18 — McKee purchase order to Houben calling for bond "without delay."11 ": 
October 
November 
Houben unable to obtain a bond after October.12 
6 — McKee called Houben first time for bond.13 . 
14 — Parker called GSL re assignment.14 Houben's first billing to GSL approved by McKee.15 
18 — GSL memos re bond sent to McKee.16 
20 — McKee called Houben second time for bond.17 Houben request for disbursement in care of law fkm.18 
December 1 — GSL disbursement to Houben.19 
IOEX. 9-P 18Tr. 177 16Ex. 22-D; Tr. 120,227 19Ex. 36-D 
"Ex. 11-P 14Tr. 162-163 17Tr. 175, 177,184-185 
"Tr. 168, 172-173 15Exs. 41-D, 42-D; Tr. 275-276 18Ex. 29-D 
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McKee has not contradicted the rule that if the 
parties had learned of Houben's circumstances in No-
vember, 1969, when the time for obtaining the bond had 
passed, GSL could not have been required to do more 
than to act reasonably under the circumstances. (Opening 
brief, pp. 34-35.) No one testified that the termination of 
Houben at that point or later would have been to GSL's 
benefit. The only testimony as to the reasonableness 
of GSL's conduct and the practical necessity of con-
tinuing with the original contractor is referred to at 
pp. 15, 42 of our opening brief. 
McKee has pointed to no evidence of knowledge 
on the part of GSL of the bond's absence in September 
or October to support Finding of Fact No. 8. See our 
opening brief at p. 9 with respect to evidence as to No-
vember 18, which date was the subject of Mr. Derricott's 
deposition. 
C. This is not a case for the application of the doc-
trine of estoppel: — McKee has not called attention in 
its brief (pp. 41-42) to any material fact which it claims 
GSL induced McKee to believe and which GSL should 
now be precluded from denying. Nor has McKee pointed 
to any change of position on McKee's part by reason 
of an alleged inducement. The record is silent with re-
spect to any showing of a wrongful intent or culp-
ability on the part of GSL or that McKee was excus-
ably ignorant of the true facts. Therefore, the doctrine 
of estoppel is not available to McKee. Migliaccio v. 
Dcwis, 120 Ut. 1, 232 P.2d 195, 198 (1951). 
14 
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The suggestion that McKee has suffered pecuniary 
loss by reason of any breach of duty owed to it by GSL 
(pp. 42-43) seems to us to distort things terribly. McKee 
has never claimed any loss by reason of its employment 
as GSL's agent and no authority is cited for the propo-
sition that a principal is bound to protect his agent 
from liability for a breach of the agent's duty to his 
principal. If the evidence makes a case for estoppel by 
silence, the party to be stopped is the agent who led 
its principal in harm's way by failing to see that the 
bond was obtained without delay and gave no warning. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court on plainitff's complaint should be re-
versed with directions that judgment be entered for the 
plaintiff. 
Eespectfully, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
Claron C. Spencer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing reply brief 
Tpre mailed to counsel for the defendant-respondent this 
/ - ^ l of May 1975. /J/ L / 
Claron C- Spencef 
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